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Extra resources for Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language

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22 CHAPTER I The sentence 'It is not the case that Socrates wore sandals' is also extensional. Its truth-value is determined by the truth-value of its component sentence 'Socrates wore sandals', which is, in turn, determined by the extensions of the components 'Socrates' and 'wore sandals'; thus, the extension of the whole sentence is a function of the extensions of these smaller components. Indeed, the result of preftxing any extensional sentence with the expression 'It is not the case that' will be a sentence that is also extensional.

Unlike the relations of being taller than, being to the left of, riding, and kicking, intentional relations need not relate persons to existing objects. Smith cannot ride a pink elephant or be taller than Godot, for there are no such entities; yet Smith's acts of seeing a pink elephant and waiting for (or anticipating) Godot are equally as intentional as those of seeing Secretariat and waiting for the postman. After all, to see a pink elephant is not to see nothing, nor is waiting for Godot the same as waiting for nothing at all.

Such act-sentences attribute propositional acts, or propositional attitudes, to a person. It is just these sentences of propositional attitude that have received most of the attention from philosophers interested in the logic and semantics of act-sentences, and our discussion of intensionality will accordingly focus on them. But not all acts are propositional, and not all act-sentences are sentences of propositional attitude, constructed by prefixing act-operators to sentences. 4 above) are described by such sentences as 'Husserl sees the tree in the garden' or 'Smith remembers the winner of the tournament', in which an act-verb is immediately followed by a noun phrase functioning as a grammatical direct-object.

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