By Mikhail Kissine
As a rule our utterances are immediately interpreted as speech acts: as assertions, conjectures and stories; as orders, requests and pleas; as threats, deals and grants. unusually, the cognitive correlates of this crucial element of human conversation have acquired little awareness. This ebook fills the space via offering a version of the mental tactics all in favour of analyzing and knowing speech acts. the idea is framed in naturalistic phrases and is supported by means of information on language improvement and on autism spectrum problems. Mikhail Kissine doesn't presuppose any particular history and addresses a very important pragmatic phenomenon from an interdisciplinary standpoint. it is a beneficial source for tutorial researchers and graduate and undergraduate scholars in pragmatics, semantics, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics and philosophy of language.
Advance compliment: "Mikhail Kissine offers a so much finished and compelling case for the learn of literal and nonliteral speech acts inside a conscientiously naturalistic technique. His information and arguments, which problem theoretical confusions and frequent assumptions, make up an incredible step forward. From Utterances to Speech Acts is a fascinating learn, novel and eye-opening - a lucid, evidence-based version of the examine of direct and oblique language use between usually and atypically constructing individuals." --Professor Rachel Giora, Tel Aviv University
"Kissine deals a brand new concept of speech acts that is philosophically subtle and builds on paintings in cognitive technological know-how, formal semantics, and linguistic typology. This hugely readable, incredible essay is a tremendous contribution to the field." --François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod
"Kissine's From Utterances to Speech Acts is an unique, expert and compelling new contribution to the literature at the nature of speech acts. Kissine presents reliable purposes to place apart greatly approved Gricean bills by way of advanced intentions, partly according to updated empirical information. He offers another account, on which speech acts constitutively exhibit purposes (to think or to act), and develops precise illustrative bills of constative, directive and commisive speech acts - paradigmatically together with, respectively, assertions, orders and offers. Kissine convincingly argues that his account is appropriate with the empirical effects that end up challenging for Gricean perspectives, and often with a naturalistic stance. The e-book contains many unique conceptual proposals - between them, a brand new tackle Austin's contrast among the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, and a suggestion to interchange classifications of illocutionary forces when it comes to "direction of fit" by means of a contrast among methods of providing a locutionary content material, a possible one - uncommitted to the reality or falsity of the content material, using to orders between speech acts and imaginings or wishes between psychological acts -, and a non-potential one, using to ideals, assertions, intentions and provides. a few of the book's proposals should be taken up and tested extra even more extensive by way of researchers. i feel the e-book will therefore deeply effect the process impending examine on its topics." --Manuel García-Carpintero, trademarks, collage of Barcelona
Read Online or Download From Utterances to Speech Acts PDF
Best semantics books
This paintings provides a unified conception of point inside common Grammar. It offers an strange blend of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic methods to a unmarried area, and provides exact linguistic analyses of 5 languages with very assorted aspectual structures: English, French, Mandarin chinese language, Navajo and Russian.
During this brief monograph, John Horty explores the problems provided for Gottlob Frege's semantic conception, in addition to its smooth descendents, by way of the therapy of outlined expressions. The ebook starts through targeting the mental constraints governing Frege's inspiration of feel, or that means, and argues that, given those constraints, even the therapy of straightforward stipulative definitions led Frege to big problems.
Linguistic research of the discussion of Italian cinema, utilizing techniques and methodologies from pragmatics, dialog research and discourse research.
- Semantics & Pragmatics Vol 3 (2010)
- Journal on Data Semantics XIV
- Computation of Language: An Essay on Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics in Natural Man-Machine Communication
- Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, Volume 2: The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument (Philosophia Antiqua)
- Meinongian logic : the semantics of existence and nonexistence
- Words without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity
Additional resources for From Utterances to Speech Acts
To be efficient, a storage method must disallow internal inconsistency. But for Intentional states that do not store information, no such consistency constraint applies. Unlike de dicto beliefs, desires store no information. Consequently, there is nothing irrational in having contradictory desires. Desires are not the only kind of mental state to lack closure under conjunction. There is nothing irrational for Oedipus, in pondering over his decision to propose to Jocasta, to imagine himself married to Jocasta, and to imagine himself living on his own.
Recently, I spent an hour talking with a person whose name I did not know (and was too embarrassed to ask) and who I thought to be my new neighbour; in fact, this person was my new neighbour’s sister. When we have beliefs about particulars sometimes our mental apprehension of these particulars is backed by erroneous descriptions. A corollary to this fact, to which I turn now, is the possibility of ascribing beliefs in two different ways: de dicto and de re. The first kind of ascription, de dicto, identifies the content of the belief in terms proper to the subject’s apprehension of the reality – the content of the belief in this case is said to be narrow.
The speaker of (33) does not assert that the party is lovely; but neither does she present herself as believing that the party is lovely. The speaker of (34) does not request A to ruin her carpet, but neither does she present herself as having the desire that A should ruin her carpet. Therefore it does not make sense to say that (33) indicates S’s belief that the party is lovely or that (34) indicates S’s desire that A ruin her carpet. The same line of thought applies to translation. A translator does not perform any illocutionary act in her name – she is not responsible for the illocutionary act performed by the speaker of the source-language.